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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prolif~ration of new states and the subsequent emergence of the Third World 
has been one of the most significant features in contemporary international society since 
World War II.· The identity of the Third World as an international legal system, however, 
is often overlooked. The Third World should be regarded as a single international legal 
system, separate from the individual laws of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This 
identification is necessary because "[a] system as a whole usually has 'system properties' 
which are absent in anyone of its components alone."2 
Several reasons justify the consideration of the Third World as a single international 
legal system. First, both underdeveloped and developed nations have neglected the study 
* LL.B Korea University, LL.M. (International Law) Harvard Law School. 
1 For a discussion on the Third World in international law see E. MCWHINNEY, CONFLICT AND 
COMPAOMISE: IN'ttRNATIONAL LAw AND WORLD ORDER IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (1981); T. ELIAS, 
AFilICA AND THE DtVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, v (1972) [hereinafter ELIAS]; R. ANAND, 
NEW STATU AND INTERNATIONAL LAW I (1972); O. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND 
TOMORROW 72-101 (1965) [hereinafter LISSITZYN]; A. Fatouros, Participation of the 'New' States in 
the International Legal Order of the Future, reprinted in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER 820-50 (R, Falk & C. Black ed. 1969) [hereinafter FatourosJ. 
2 K. DEUTSCH, THE ANALySIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1198 (1978). 
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of the Third World as an international legal system. In the study of international law, 
"Traditional international law," "Eurocentric international law" and "Soviet international 
law" have been recognized. No effort, however, has been made to recognize the Third 
World's significant contributions to the development of international law. Regarding the 
Third World as an international legal system would enhance the development of con-
temporary international law. 
Second, considering the global future, it is necessary to identify the Third World as 
a separate international legal system. The debate on the global future, whose central 
issue is to establish effective patterns of order, has been affected by the Superpowers' 
fight for hegemony.3 The Third World should participate in this debate because without 
Third World input, the Superpowers may establish a world order that ignores the needs 
of many nations. 
Thus, the real issue is determining which world order is desirable for both developed 
and underdeveloped countries, and how that world order is to be achieved. This article 
does not intend to shape the future of the global international legal system, instead it 
will clarify the status of the Third World as an international legal system. 
However, several factors question whether the Third World does in fact constitute 
a single system of international law. First, can the Third World be deemed an interna-
tionallegal system given its cultural diversity? The relevance of culture to international 
law is the basis for the existence of Third World international law outside of European 
traditional law. This article indicates that cultural diversity among Third World nations 
does not prevent the Third World's systematization as a single international legal system. 
Second, given the universality of international law, is the rationale supporting the 
First World international legal system, the Second World international legal system and 
the Third World international legal system justified? This article does not deny the 
universality of international law. However, the universality of international law should 
be understood as developing inductively from diverse regional national laws. Thus, 
considering the international legal system as a three-system group does not undermine 
the universality of international law. 
Third, and most importantly, does the Third World have a legal structure that 
characterizes a legal system? "A ... legal system is analyzed ... in three components: 
cultural, structural and substantive.'" The cultural component refers to "the values and 
attitudes which bind the system together and determine the place of the legal system in 
the culture of the society as a whole."5 The structural component, refers to "the insti-
tutions themselves, the forms they take, and the processes that they perform."6 The 
substantive component refers to "the output side of the legal system, the laws regardless 
of their formal or informal status."7 The structure, values and legal contributions of the 
Third World to international law will demonstrate that the Third World has the com-
ponents necessary to constitute a single legal system. 
Throughout the article, the relationship between the Third World and the inter-
national legal systems is considered to demonstrate the Third World's contributions to 
the development of international law. The underlying basis of this article is that "inter-
's. KIM, THE QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER 327 (1984). 
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national law is and has been a developing legal system."· The Third World through the 
Non-Aligned Movement has added cultural diversity which widens the scope and uni-
versal application of international law. Thus, this article will indicate that the Third 
World's significant contributions to international law mandate recognition of its status 
as a single legal system that will influence the development of international law. 
II. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Law reflects societal values. If a law does not represent current social values, that 
law is amended or repealed by the national legislative authority. "The logical prerequisite 
for making [law] acceptable to its subjects is ... their agreement upon values."9 Moreover, 
"[t]he greater the cultural heterogeneity of the area in which law is supposed to operate, 
the more relevant value concerns become. It is a tacit premise of legal theory that a legal 
system depends upon a value consensus and contributes to that consensus."10 
The effectiveness of international law has been disputed because of the diversity of 
values or, more generally, the heterogeneity of cultures in international society. Thus, 
when examining the Third World as an international legal system, two issues must be 
examined: (1) whether cultural diversity is relevant to international law, given the great 
differences between the West ll and the Third World; (2) whether the Third World can 
be considered an international legal system, given the cultural diversity of Third World 
nations. 
Traditional international law originated and developed in Europe during the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. Over the centuries, the scope of international law has 
grown to accommodate the needs of diverse cultures. As colonial nations received their 
independence following World War II, cultural diversity in the world has increased. The 
newly independent nations entering the international legal system prompt some scholars 
to view international law as an inter~culturallaw, rather than a culturally specific law.12 
Contemporary international law is not influenced by specific cultures but reflects an 
amalgamation of all cultures; hence international law automatically incorporates diverse 
cultural values. Thus, the relevance of anyone cultural group is debatable. 
Arguments for the irrelevance of cultural differences to international law are sup-
ported by the concept that international relations are not based on ideology or values. 
Empirical evidence indicates that the existence and efficacy of international law is not 
influenced by a nation's culture but depends on the interests the states are pursuing. IS 
Proponents of this viewpoint stress that the behavior of international judges and the 
practice of international courts are culturally neutral. 14 These decisions, they argue, 
indicate that the only noticeable influence upon judges was the national interests of their 
countries, and not their nation's culture. 15 
8 jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations, 58 AM. j. INT'L L. 343 (1964). 
9W. LEVI, LAw AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 135 (1979). 
10 W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 217 (1970). 
II The term "West" includes not only North America and Western Europe but also Eastern 
Europe. 
12 See supra note 10. 
U LEVI, supra note 9, at 135-50; Fatouros, supra note I, at 346-50; A. SHEIKH, INTERNATIONAL 
LAw AND NATIONAL BEHAVIOR 237-42 (1974). 
14 Tanaka, The Character of World Law in The International Court of Justice, JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 15-
17 (1971). 
15 F. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 110-12 (1969); N.J. Pa-
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Despite, these DbservatiDI,lS, cultuJal values at:e relevant tD internatio,pal l;i,w. First, 
Article 9~ .of the Stau~te .of the InternatiDnal. CDurt .of Justice <;lesignates the CDurt as a 
"whDle representatiDn .of ~he main fDrms .of civilizatiDn and D( th~ principal legal systems 
.of the WDrld." 16 At;ticle 9 i.ndica.tes tha,t cultural values, are indeed relevant tD internatiDnal 
lilw and the leJ must cDnsider the diverse cultures .of nations. SecDnd, the rules which 
the CDuXt applies are Il9t a,lways, universal Dr culturally neutral. Often, "the CDurt ... 
consider[s] ~,~ether there [is] a special. custom in capital states giving states of the 
sharehDJders loCtIJ standi und.er th~ circumstances 9£ the particldar case."17 FurthermDre, 
it has been suggested that an. established custom amDng a well-defined grDUp of states 
is binding on all sta~es in that group, except thDse states who, consistently oppDsed the 
custDm (rom its inceptiDn. ls Finally,' the premise that state interests which characterize 
foreign policy are ind,epender;tt of values Dr cultur«< disregar<;ls the fact that state interests 
are not necessru;ily value-free. 19 For example, a ''Jih1id'' or holy war is explained, not only 
by the nCltio~1 interes~ of territorial expansiDn but by the Islamic philosophy: unity .of 
God, 110ity of mankind, and, the unity of religion.20 Hence, it is incorrect t.o assume that 
culture is iI;relevant in international law and pDlitics. 
Thus, scholars WhD sUppDrt the irrelevance of culture. to internatiDnal law are nDt 
cDnvinci,ng. l'he relevaJ:lce of culture. to internatiDnallaw has transformed cDntemporary 
internat;ional ~w into all, inter-cultural la~. Inter-cultural law i~ defined as internatiDnal 
law whi~b results when a c;ultura,lly spedfic law evolves into a culturally diverse law. FDr 
example, int(!r-culturallaw reflects the changes in international law fDIIDwing World War 
II. Prior tD World War n, internatiDnall,!-w reflected the ideDlogies of Europe and tD a 
lesser exten~, the Uni,ted S~tes. CDlonial independence fDllowing WDrld War II created 
new s~ates whDse. id~ologi~s expanded the cultural values which shape contempDrary 
inten:Ip.tiopal law. Thus, ipternational law has become inter-cultural law through the 
assimilation .of nDn-Western values. 
The merit .of viewing internationalla;w as inter-cultural law is reinfDrced by the fact 
that "althQJ.lgh the cultural distanCeS between many nations .of the wDrld still remain 
great, the <;ulture D( the world is hDmDgenizing."21 Yet, the sCDpe .of international law 
increases as international law reflects culturally diverse values. MDreDver, this, growth of 
internationCiI law due tD its. :t;ecDgniti.on Qf values wil) guarantee its effectiveness. "Inter-
national law itself is a piece of world culture, cDnsisting precisely .of thDse shared values 
designed to handle disputes. Starting as a, system Qf rules tD gDvern relatiDns between 
dC':lford. The Composition of the Intemationa( Court of Justice: Background and Practice, in THE RELEVANCE 
Of INTERNATIONAL LAw 320-26 (K.W. Deutsch. & S, Hoffman eds. 1971). 
I~ In 1977 the composition of the International Court of Justice included: six Europeans 
including two from ComlllUnist stat~s, two La~n Americans, three Africans, two Asians, one Syrian, 
and one No.r;th Americap.. I. BRDWNLIJ:, PIuNCIPLES.OF PUBLIC lNTERNATIONAL LAW 715 (1979). 
17 See Barcelona Traction (Belguim v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 273-74, 277 (Gros, J. dissenting) 
[h~reina(ter .l;'arcelona Traction Case]. 
18 See. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAw AND CODIFICATION 135-41 (1972). 
19 Even ProfessoJ; Fatouros, who dismisses the relc;vance of cultural differences to modern 
problems, admits that national interests are significantly affected by the country's culturaJ tradition 
and its hierarchy of xalues. See Fatouros, supra note. 1, at 3.48-50. 
2OC.S. RHYNE, INTEI!.NATIONAL LAw ~3 (1971). See also LEVI, supra note 9, at 140. The alternative 
of regional. ipJernational <;ourts is frequently suggested as a way to provide cultural homogeneity. 
The limited success of these courts in. Wester~ Europe reinforces the relevance of culture to 
international law. 
21 D. BMCK, THE BEHAVIOR. OF LAW 78 (1976). 
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European states, international law has since been virtually globalized."22 Yet, despite 
these trends, international law is still Euro-centric, not because international law had its 
origin in Europe, but because international law has not incorporated the cultural values 
of the non,western world. Since international law is also inter-cultural law it must reflect 
cultural principles inherent in the Third World.2S 
Despite regional cultural differences, the Third World can be treated as a single 
international legal system. The Third World is generally composed of three regions: 
Latin America, Asia and Africa. Cultural diversity among these regions has prompted 
the establishment of regional supranational laws. This cultural diversity complicates an 
examination of the Third World as a single entity. However, there is a common element 
which binds Africa, Asia and Latin America as the Third World and which unites the 
Third World as a single international legal system. 
Clearly, the commQn bond in the Third World is a shared anti-colonialist sentiment. 
Nations of the Third World are conscious of their underdeveloped economies. Many 
Third World countries "blame colonialism for their economic disparity and for political 
instability."24 Most Third World countries have feelings of resentment about past ex-
ploitation by the preseIlt First World. Third World countries believe that the policies of 
neo-colonialism cause them to be treated as second-class citizens. Although some scholars 
la~el this anti-colonialist sentiment as "sensitivity of many new states to often trivial 
questions involving colonialism,"25 this sentiment "constitutes specific patterns of behav-
ior which correspond to perceptions of national interest."26 Since the nations of the 
Third World share a common national interest, self-determination, they act in interna-
tional law as a single legal system. Accordingly, the Third World has contributed to 
international law in the areas of self-determination and non-intervention, and the estab-
lishment of the New Ioternational Economic Order and New World Information Order. 
III. UNIVERSALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The concept of "universality," has two dimensions: scope and application.27 The 
scope of international law is universal when "a single international law governs Western 
and Qon-Western, Christian and non-Christian, or Communist and non-Communist 
states alike."28 A law is universally applicable when "the same results are achieved in the 
same or comparable contexts when the only difference lies in the identity of the parties 
to the controversy."29 Prior to the emergence of the Second World and the Third World, 
22 A.A. Mazrui, World Culture and the Search for Human Consensw, in ON THE CREATION OF A 
JUST WORLD ORDER 18 (S. Medlovits ed. 1975). 
251tl. at 17. 
24 Alvarez, Tensions and Conflicts in the Third World, 3 THIRD W.Q. 647 (1981). 
25 Fatouros, supra note 1, at 350. 
26ld. If culture is defined as the complex aggregate of religious, philosophical, and historical 
traditions, Professor Fatouros admits that ~here is a cultural impact on international law. However, 
this definition of culture may be so unique that it limits the culture's relevance to international law. 
27 See Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time, 169 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 240-41 (1980). 
28 McDougal Be Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 170 (L. Gross ed. 1969) For an unorganized 
international society, the geographical scope of international law is universal, in the sense that it 
extends to the whole world. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976). 
29 Lasswell, supra note 28, at 170. 
42 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:37 
the universality of international law was unquestioned, and the scope of international 
law was limited to Europe. The universality problem arises because the dismantling of 
colonialism following World War II forced the scope of international law to expand. 
Therefore, the issue is whether the expanded scope of international law has diminished 
its universality. ,0 
Some supporters of the universality of international law state that "since 1856 the 
European Christian law of nations ... spread so as to constitute today universal inter-
national law, binding also on nations of non-occidental legal and value systems."'l Fur-
thermore, they state that the non-occidental legal and value systems "threaten neither 
the existence nor the development of universal internationallaw."'2 
However, this reasoning that the universality of basically Euro-centric, international 
law will be maintained as it was before the emergence of the Second World and the 
Third World because non-occidental value systems are compatible with those of the 
West, is incorrect. The Third World neither entered the world arena by permission of 
the already existing states, nor will it accept the existing Euro-centric international law 
without examination. Only to the extent that the Third World has accepted the existing 
international law, can it be deemed universal. This reasoning ignores the process of the 
universalization of the principles of regional non-universal legal systems where Euro-
centric international law, Soviet international law and Third World international law, 
may be components of the global international legal system. 
Furthermore the universal rules of international law are made inductively, devel-
oping from non-universal regional laws. Although this contradicts the universality of 
international law, it reinforces the character of international law as inter-cultural law. 
Inter-cultural international law, however, is becoming universal because it reflects cul-
tures and values prevalent throughout the world. Indeed, as the development of tech-
nology and communication aids mutual understanding throughout the world, the world 
is becoming more homogeneous. Therefore, universal international law will operate in 
an even more expanded context. 
Despite the cultural differences of the First, Second, and Third Worlds, the univ-
ersalization of contemporary international law has continued. Non-universal movements 
to intensify international law are apparent in each world: strengthened European Com-
munity law in the First World, recognition of the Soviet international legal system guided 
by the "Soviet internationalism" within the Soviet Union," and the Third World's effort 
to act in concert through the Non-Aligned Movement. Although the three worlds may 
be strengthening their regional international legal systems, these non-universal legal 
systems produce universal international law. The universalization of international law 
requires the assimilation of regional or non-universal law. Thus, an examination of the 
Third World as a regional international legal system is necessary to assess the contribu-
tions of the Third World to developing universal international law. 
'0 See generally Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415-29 
(1973); Tunkin, International Law in the International System, 147 RECUEIL DES COURS 78-84 (1975); 
Lachs, supra note 27; Lasswell, supra note 28; Kunz, Pluralism of Legal and Value Systems and Inter-
national Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 370 (1968). H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-
45 (1986). 
31 Kunz, supra note 30. 
32Id. 
33 Mitchell & Leonhard, Changing Soviet Attitudes Toward International Law: Incorporative Approach, 
6 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 227-44 (1976). 
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IV. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: REPRESENTING THE THIRD WORLD AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
43 
In light of the existing non-universal legal systems and the relevance of culture to 
international law, the Third World can be deemed an international legal system which 
contributes to the development of international law. However, the question arises 
whether the Third World composes a single international legal system. The Non-Aligned 
Movement, (NAM) represents the values and goals of the Third World and can be 
considered the Third World's legal system. 
The term "the Third World" was first coined in France in the early 1950's at a time 
of increasing polarization of the international system. The two principal poles, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, sought to sustain and extend their leadership and discipline 
over the respective alliance systems.34 It is common to regard the United States and the 
Western European countries as the First World, and the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
European countries as the Second World. The Third World includes Asia (excluding 
Japan), Africa (excluding South Africa) and Latin America.3s 
There are many terms for the Third World such as developing countries, under-
developed countries, newly independent countries, the Group of 77, (G77) or the Non-
Aligned Movement. Today, it is apparent that the Group of 77, now containing 125 
members, and the Non-Aligned Movement, now containing 101 members, are the prin-
cipal organizations representing the Third World in world affairs.36 Hence the question 
arises: which organization is the true representative of the Third World? 
In the 1960's, G77 concentrated on economic issues while NAM started as a political 
cause. However, in the 1970's as membership in the two organizations overlapped, 
tension occurred. Some member states of G77 which were not members of NAM argued 
that NAM was a rival organization of G77.37 Although "Third World spokesmen were 
inclined to stress ... that the ... two associations were complementary, not competitive 
associations for the prosecution of their causes,"3B there are facts which reinforce the 
position that NAM is representative of the Third World. NAM's significance is apparent 
in economic issues. First, NAM launched major economic initiatives such as the New 
International Economic Order on behalf of the Third World. Second, NAM has an 
Action Programme for Economic Cooperation with specified Coordinator Countries 
responsible for its implementation, whereas G77 has not implemented similar projects. 39 
Third, NAM operates as a distinct entity, independent of international organizations,40 
34 Lyon, The Emergence of the Third World, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 229 
(H. Bull & A. Watson eds. 1984). 
35 Alternatively, Mao Tse Tung, considered the United States and the Soviet Union to compose 
the First World. Europe, Canada, and Japan formed the Second World while the remaining nations 
including Communist China composed the Third World. Quoted in W. Tieya, The Third World and 
International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 956 (R. Macdonald & D. 
Johnston eds. 1983). 
36 See R. JACKSON, THE NON-ALIGNED, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUPERPOWERS 5 (1983). 
37Id. at 28. 
38 Lyon, supra note 34, at 234. 
39 Since the Fourth Summit Conference, an "Action Programme of Economic Co-operation" 
has been adopted at each conference. 
40 e77 has its origin in the "Caucus of 75" where developing countries prepared their goals 
for the first UNCTAD Conference. See Department of State Library, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
DICTIONARY 32 (1980). 
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whereas G77 operates as a caucus only within the United Nations and has no separate 
activities. 
As a whole, NAM, actively involved in economic issues, is also broader in focus and 
acts as coordinator and lobbyist for its member states on a range of political, social, and 
economic issues. In addition, the use in the Algiers Declarqtion41 of the terms "non-
aligned," "developing countries," and "the Third World" is without apparent distinction 
and indicates that NAM identifies their interests as those of all Third World countries. 
Furthermore, NAM truly represents the Third World in that it has tried to keep an 
independent outlook uninfluenced by the Superpowers in international affairs, though 
some NAM theoreticians insist on "the movement's global rather than Third World 
mission."42 Thus, the assumption that NAM is the primary representative of the Third 
World is adequately supported. 
NAM organizes the Third World into an international sub-system. Three criteria 
must be satisfied in order for NAM to be identified as an international subsystem in 
relation to the global international system. First, NAM must be entirely contained by the 
global system. Second, NAM must be numerically or quantitatively smaller than the 
global system. Third, in conflicts of opinion, NAM must be theoretically subdued.43 
In light of these criteria, NAM qualifies as an international subsystem in relation to 
the global international system. The members of NAM are entirely contained by global 
international organizations. Furthermore, Non-Aligned countries interact within NAM 
and in the international community with "non-alignment" as their foreign policy goal. 
Additionally, Non-Aligned countries demonstrate their status as an international subsys-
tem by participating in periodic summit conferences and in regional cooperation.44 
Although NAM is an international sub-system, the question arises whether the Non-
Aligned countries can be labeled as a bloc. The First Summit in Belgrade stated cate-
gorically that "the non-aligned countries represented at this conference do not wish to 
form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc."45 This attitude dominates NAM principles and 
periodic descriptions of NAM as a Third World bloc have elicited vehement denial 
within the organization. This attitude arises because the fundamental philosophy of non-
alignment, the embryo of the present NAM, is inherently anti-bloc. NAM, however, has 
gradually institutionalized itself. Such institutionalization eventually leads to the forma-
tion of a bloc.46 
There are, however, only slight differences between a "movement" and a "bloc." 
Although NAM began with a policy of "non-alignment," the institutionalization of the 
movement's structure has inherently changed NAM's policy. Accordingly, since the 
Fourth Summit Conference in Algiers, coordination of non-aligned economic strategy 
has resulted in the formation of an aligned voting bloc at the United Nations.47 Thus, 
41 See 24 REV. INT'L AFF. 19-33 (1973). 
42 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 5. 
43 Quoted in B. KOR.-\NY, SOCIAL CHANGE, CHARISMA AND INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: TOWARD A 
THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN THE THIRD WORLD 149 (1976). 
44Id. at 150-51. 
45 See Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, 12 REv. INT'L 
AFF.42-46. 
46 Rajan, Insitutionalization of Non-Alignment: Widening Gulf Between the Belief and the Prospect, 20 
INT'L STUD. 54 (1981). There is the danger of the movement becoming a third block by the backdoor 
of economic cooperation. It may become a third bloc by not pretending to. Id. 
47 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 28, 54. Following the Algiers Summit, co-ordination of non-aligned 
economic strategy has been the rule at UN meetings. 
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while members still dispute the term "bloc," NAM is becoming a bloc despite the policy 
of non-alignment envisioned by its founders. 48 
The global effect of the development of NAM is a loosening of the structure of 
tight bipolarity of the Superpowers. NAM's impact on the international system has caused 
an "[i]nterpenetration between system-wide and sub-systemic issues and the system, 
becoming more complex, manifested features of both bipolarity and multipolarity."49 In 
short, NAM's creation of a multipolar system seems to have reduced the risk of rigid 
bipolarity because nations remain independent rather than aligning with the Superpow-
ers.50 In this respect NAM has had a positive effect on the international system. 
NAM, as an international subsystem, has had a critical effect on the global inter-
national legal system. NAM's significant effect in international relations will be even 
greater if NAM is recognized as an international legal system. In order for NAM to be 
recognized as an individual legal system, it must satisfy the three components of a legal 
system: values, structure and substance.5l 
A. Values Within the Non-Aligned Movement 
NAM's historical development can be briefly summarized as follows: 
In 1946 the contemporary international system numbered 59 national actors 
and by 1970 the membership had risen to 127. This membership increase 
of more than 100 percent is due largely to the decline Qf colonial empires 
and the emergence of Afro-Asian states. Reacting against their recent colonial 
past, the leaders of most of these states insisted on the "demonstration" of 
their newly won independence and the playing of a distinctive international 
role. They tried to achieve this end by rejecting formal incorporation in, or 
subordination to, any of the then existing blocs.52 
Three guiding values were predominant in NAM's development: anti-bloc, anti-
colonialism and peace protected from the tension between East and West. The prioriti-
zation of NAM's guiding values has fluctuated. Consequently, to define NAM's current 
values, NAM's history must be examined. 
1. From Bandung to Beigrade5S 
The creation of NAM can be traced back to the "spirit of Bandung" which was 
strongly influenced by five principles known as the PanchsheeJ.54 At the Bandung Con-
ference, the Panchsheel was incorporated into ten principles which guided the evolution 
of non-alignment. In addition, the Bandung Conference devoted attention to common 
4SId. at 10. 
49 KORANY, supra note 43, at 363-66. Professor Rosecrance refers to this as "bi-multipolarity," 
Professor Kaplan calls it "loose-bipolarity," and Professor Holsti uses the term "diffuse-bloc system." 
50 R. Roaecrance, Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future, 10 J. CONFLICT REs. 314-27 (1967). 
51 See Friedman, supra note 4. 
52 KORANY, supra note 43, at 15-16. 
58 For the text of the documents adopted at the First through Seventh Summit Conferences 
see REv. INT'L AFF.: vols. 12, 15,21,24,27,30,34. 
51 The principles of Pancsheel are derived from the Indian tradition of non-violence and include 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonagression, mutual non-interference in 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 
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problems of colonialism, economic development, and maintenance of peace.55 However, 
the Bandung Conference was not a genuine, non-aligned conference because some of 
the countries present retained alliances with the Superpowers.56 
Ideological differences between the "moderates" and the "militants" influenced the 
priority of guiding principles. At the First Summit at Belgrade in 1961, the moderates, 
led by India's Nehru, thought non-aligned action was essentially mediatory. The mod-
erates believed that the maintenance of world peace should be of ultimate importance, 
while all other issues such as imperialism, colonialism and racism should be secondary 
prioritiesY The militants, led by Indonesia's Sukarno and supported by many Africans, 
thought non-aligned action was essentially combative. They believed that the root of 
international tension was imperialism and colonialism, which should be actively fought 
against.58 
The moderates were able to outmaneuver the militants in setting priorities. At 
Nehru's insistence, a separate "Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for 
Peace"59 was adopted, and global issues concerning peace were given priority in the final 
declaration. Additionally, the Bandung Conference created an awareness of the need 
for economic cooperation between the nations of the Third World which led to the 
establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
in 1964.60 
2. From Cairo to the Present 
Following the first UNCTAD meeting at Geneva in 1964, the Second Summit was 
held in Cair061 at a time of unusual solidarity within the Third World. At the Second 
Summit, the African majority promoted the right to force decolonization. Accordingly, 
the Cairo Declaration asserts that colonized people may legitimately resort to arms, and 
contains multiple provisions condemning imperialist and colonial exploitation.62 The 
Declaration also refers to the need for a "new international economic policy," foreshad-
owing NAM's demands for the NIEO.63 
The Third Summit was held at Lusaka in 1970.64 At this summit, NAM's institu-
tionalization began with a resolution which called on the Chairman, Zambian President 
Kaunda, to take steps necessary to maintain contact among member countries and carry 
55 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 13. 
56 These countries were Turkey, Pakistan, Communist China, Japan, Thailand, and the Phil-
ippines. See Lyon, supra note 34, at 229. 
57 Nehru's speech at the First Summit, 12 REV. INT'L AFF. 20-22 (1961). 
58 Sukarno's speech at the First Summit, id. at 11-12. 
59Id. at 42. 
60 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 21. 
61 At this conference, the Programme For Peace and International Co-operation was adopted. 
See 15 REV. INT'L AFF. 79-89 (1964). 
62 See Part I of the Cairo Declaration, Concerted Action for the Liberation of the Countries Still 
Dependent; Elimination of Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism, reprinted in 15 REv. INT'L AFF. 
80-82 (1964). 
63 See Part X of the Cairo Declaration, Economic Development and Co-operation, reprinted in 15 REV. 
INT'L AFF. 86-88 (1964). 
64 At this conference, the Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Coop-
eration and Democratization of International Relations and the Lusaka Declaration on Non-Align-
ment and Economic Progress were adopted. See 21 REV. INT'L AFF. 11-38 (1970). 
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out their decisions. The resolution also requested member countries to participate in the 
United Nations.65 
At the Fourth Summit in Algiers in 1973,66 the focus of NAM shifted from peaceful 
coexistence to militant anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The Political Declaration 
of the Fourth Summit stated that "so long as there are colonial wars, apartheid, impe-
rialist aggression, power politics and economic exploitation and plundering, peace will 
be limited both in principle and in scope."67 
The Fourth Summit was a victory for the militant African and Arab countries. The 
primacy of decolonization over traditional NAM principles was upheld and the existing 
economic order was identified as a colonial legacy in the Economic Declaration of the 
Fourth Summit.68 The Fourth Summit's Declaration on the Struggle for the National 
Liberation asserted that oppressed people had no alternative and thus have a legitimate 
recourse to armed struggle.69 The Fifth Summit at Sri Lanka in 197670 merely reiterated 
the positions taken at the Fourth Summit.71 
Conflicting views on NAMjeopardized the Sixth Summit at Havana in 1979.72 The 
socialist bloc led by Cuba tried in vain to reorient NAM as their "natural ally."73 Although 
NAM's founding members argued for the original principles and objectives of NAM, 
anti-colonialism was the main focus of the Summit.74 At the Seventh Summit at New 
Delhi in 1983,75 member states moved to emphasize new causes over colonial issues; 
"some delegates referred to the end of the colonial era and the need to find a new, more 
relevant ethos for NAM."76 However, anti-colonialism continued to influence the Sum-
mit's outcome.77 The Political Statement of the Final Declaration continued to define 
NAM in anti-imperialistic terms.78 
In conclusion, it is evident that since the Second Summit, NAM has been guided by 
the goals of anti-colonialism and economic development rather than the goal of world 
peace. To the extent that colonialism and neo-colonialism have diminished, anti-West, 
especially anti-US criticism has been strong within NAM. Thus, NAM's guiding principles 
or values are apparent and demand the amendment of traditional international law to 
reflect NAM's goals. 
65 Resolution on the Strengthening of the Role of the Non-Aligned Countries, reprinted in 21 
REv. INT'L AFF. 34 (1970). 
66 At this conference, the Political Declaration, Economic Declaration, and Action Programme 
of Economic Cooperation and Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation were adopted. 
See 24 REV. INT'L AFF. 19-33 (1973). 
67 [d. at 20. 
68 [d. at 23-27. 
69 [d. at 32. 
70 At this conference, the Political Declaration, Economic Declaration and Action Programme 
for Economic Cooperation were adopted. See 27 REv. INT'L AFF. 18-43 (1976). 
71 Resolution on the Question of Palestine, id. at 50. The conference endorsed UN Resolution 
3379 which determined that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. 
72 At this conference, The Final Declaration and Action Programme for Economic Co-operation 
were adopted. See 30 REv. INT'L AFF. 18-63 (1979). 
7. JACKSON, supra note 36, at 30-34. 
7. For the text of the Final Declaration, see 30 REv. INT'L AFF. 18-63 (1979). 
75 At this conference, the Final Declaration and Action Programme for Economic Co-operation 
was adopted. See 34 REv. INT'L AFF. 21-66 (1983). 
76 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 76. 
77 [d. 
78 See text of Final Declaration, supra note 75. 
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B. Structure of the Non-Aligned Movement 
The concept of non-alignment "embodies a separate identity and role for developing 
states r<;lther than fixed positions defined in relation to o\ltside blocs. "'9 At its inception, 
one of NAM's primary goals was for members to pursue foreign policies independent 
of the Superpowers. In accordance with the concept of non-alignment, NAM was not to 
be institutionalized. An institutionalized NAM would prevent each member from pur-
suing its own independent foreign policy, thereby contradicting the basis of NAM. Hence, 
no charter, no headquarters, and no permanent secretariat were considered or estab-
lished. 
During the last three decades however, the members of NAM have aligned with 
each other in order to effectively preclude alignment with the Superpowers. Indeed, 
NAM's present structure is more collective and permanent than Non-Alignment in the 
1960's and is indicative of NAM's gradual institutionalization. Thus, it is worthwhile to 
examine the current structure of NAM as an "institution" to determine whether NAM's 
institutionalization may have ramifications on the Movement's values. 
1. Membership and Interest Groups 
The criteria for NAM membership were established in June 1961 at the Cairo 
meeting of ambassadors from nineteen countries in preparation for the First Summit at 
Belgrade. At that meeting, there were two opposing groups: the "inclusivists" and the 
"exclusivists."8o The inclusivists supported broad membership whereas the exclusivists, 
supported by the militants, supported restrictive membership. A five-point definition of 
non-alignment, which would qualify a state for membership, required the state: 
1. To follow an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence with other 
countries of different political and social ideologies or to show trends toward 
such a policy. 
2. To support popular liberation movements. 
3. To refuse to join any bilateral treaty with any regional defense bloc, if 
that would mean involvement in East-West conflict. 
4. To refuse to join any collective military pact that would involve implication 
in current East-West disputes. 
5. To refuse to have on its territory any foreign military bases set up without 
NAM's consent.81 
Disputes on the membership criteria however, have caused these five criteria to be 
applied inconsistently. As the success of the summits came to depend more on attendance 
and less on the quality of delegations, increasing NAM's membership became a goal. 
Therefore, the five criterion were ignored or loosely applied. Despite contrQversy in 
certain instances,82 NAM's membership quadrupled between the Belgrade and New 
79 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 6. 
80 G.M. JANSEN, AFRO-AsIA AND NON-ALIGNMENT 235 (Faber & Faber eds. 1966). 
81 KORANY, supra note 43, at 160. 
82 South Korea's application for membership is an example of the ineffectiveness of the five 
criteria. Both Koreas applied for membership at the 1975 Lima ministerial meeting, but South 
Korea was rejected because of its support of the United States' military bases in South Korea. 
Furthermore, South Korea would not h.we been admitted because North Korea has a seat in the 
Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau (NACB) which recommends countries for membership. Hence, 
North Korea could veto South Korea's application for membership. 
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Delhi Summits because of the loose application of membership criteria. Accordingly, 
NAM faces a widening scope of complex issues based on the diversity of its new members. 
This influx of new members into NAM has caused the Movement to encompass groups 
with different ideologies and interests.83 
Where members share a common interest, they may form an interest group to 
influence NAM's actions. Interest groups in NAM have formed around common eco-
nomic systems, geographic locations and regional interests. Examples of interest groups 
which influence NAM include the group of the oil-producing states, the least developed 
states, the group of land-locked states, and the group of Indian Ocean states with regard 
to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP).84 Among the regional interest groups rep-
resented in NAM, the largest and most powerful is the African bloc which is composed 
of the fifty-one members of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), including the 
South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).85 One of the goals of the OAU is 
to affirm a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.86 Consequently, because the 
African group is the most cohesive and powerful group in NAM, once African group 
nations have agreed on an issue, their position is generally accepted not only by NAM, 
but also by the United Nations.87 
The Arab bloc is the next most vocal regional interest group. The 21-member Arab 
League is its main axis. There are, however, bitter inter-Arab splits between the mod-
erates, including Saudi Arabia, and the militants, including Libya. Consequently, the 
Arab bloc lacks the unity and power that characterizes the African group. The Latin 
American group is composed of seventeen members. Within this group, relative mod-
erates outnumber radicals although the radicals generally lead this group.88 The Asian 
region lacks a regional caucus within NAM. Only India and three members of the 
Associa.tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), play leading roles. Europe, like Asia, 
lacks a regional caucus within NAM. The participation of even a few European countries, 
Yugoslavia, Malta and Cyprus, is exceptional because Europe is generally not included 
in the Third World. 
It is difficult to depict how these diverse regional groups, apart from other interest 
groups, have acted within NAM. In international relations, there are objective boundary 
lines, such as geographical delineations, and subjective boundary lines, sucb as social-
psychological characteristics.89 Geographical delineations, however, are not enough to 
delineate the boundaries of NAM. Rather, subjective boundaries are drawn by the shared 
colonial history of NAM members and a common orientation towards non-alignment. 
Thus, although NAM's increased membership is segmented into interest groups, NAM 
retains its common bond of anti-colonialism. Consequently, NAM's position on political, 
economic and social issues is continually influenced by its philosophy of anti-colonialism. 
8' JACKSON, supra note 36, at 45. NAM's ideological differences were exemplified at the Sixth 
Summit in Havana by the radicals led by Cuba who favored a "natural ally" stance with the Soviet 
Bloc, versus a loose group of moderates who were against the pro-Soviet direction. 
84 [d. at 46. 
85 SWAPO will have no difficulty entering NAM because one of the membership criterion was 
to support liberation movements. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
86 See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, art. 3, in BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (1983). 
87 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 47. 
88 Cuba was the only Latin American member of NAM until the 1970s. Thus Cuba could have 
manipulated other Latin American members within NAM. 
89 See KORANY, supra note 43, at 152-59. 
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2. Institutionalization 
NAM's founders did not envision an institutionalized NAM. Initially, the non-aligned 
movement was a common policy of some individual states which subsequently developed 
into a series of ad hoc conferences, as exemplified by the First and Second Summits. 
Since then, NAM has developed into an internal network of institutions and organized 
cooperation. There are two reasons for this institutionalization. First, the need for 
effective cooperation within N AM requires the movement to be organized. Second, the 
continuous expansion of membership requires organization to effectively coordinate 
NAM's activities. Presently, NAM is administered by a chairman, and the Non-Aligned 
Coordinating Bureau (NACB). 
At the First Summit, the establishment of a permanent secretariat was proposed but 
was unsuccessful because of the strong anti-bloc sentiment. It was not until the Third 
Summit at Lusaka in 1970, that proposals for NAM's institutionalization were made and 
undertaken. These proposals entailed: 
(1) that a Summit Conference of NAM be held regularly at intervals of about 
three years; (2) that the host country of the last Summit Conference should 
act as the principal spokesman for NAM in the intervals between Summit 
Conferences; and (3) that the host country, acting in effect as Chairman for 
NAM, should assume responsibility for convening such other meetings as 
might be deemed desirable or necessary, as well as assuming responsibility 
for some servicing arrangements at and between conferences.9o 
Although, the establishment of a permanent secretariat was proposed at the Third 
Summit91 at Lusaka in 1970, members remained opposed to any form of institutionali-
zation. At the Fourth Summit Conference in 1973, debate over establishing a secretariat 
recurred. At the Fourth Summit, however, the chairmanship was permanently institu-
tionalized and the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau (NACB) was formed as an ongoing 
executive committee.92 
The actions taken at the Fourth Summit indicated that the chairmanship had become 
increasingly important in setting NAM's tone and general direction. NAM's loose pro-
cedure allows the chairman the advantage of formulating draft agenda and declarations 
himself rather than relying on member countries to formulate them. Consequently, this 
position controls NAM's direction because the goals and policies created by the chairman 
shape the movement's effectiveness as a Third World lobby. 
The creation of the NACB is the most significant landmark in NAM's institution-
alization process. The NACB began with seventeen members at the Fourth Summit 
Conference in Algiers. By the Sixth Summit Conference in Havana, the NACB had 
increased to thirty-six members and at the Seventh Summit Conference in New Delhi, 
it had enlarged to its present seventy-four seats. The NACB has primary responsibility 
for membership matters, shaping strategy in key areas, and NAM's central policymak-
90 See Lusaka Declarations, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
91 At this summit, The Resolution on the Strengthening of the Role of the Non-Aligned 
Countries was adopted. See supra note 65. 
92 P. Willets, The Future of the Institutions of the Non-Aligned Movement, in NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE 
EIGHTIES 340-41 (V. Popovic ed. 1982). 
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ing.93 Although the NACB is not the official permanent secretariat, the formation of 
NACB satisfies much of the need for a secretariat. In effect, NAM has an institutionalized 
secretariat. 
NAM, however, is caught in a dilemma. One commentator states that: 
[I]f they [non-aligned countries] continue to seek greater effectiveness of 
cooperation between and among themselves, they would have to resort to 
increasing institutionalization of the movement; if, on the other hand, they 
let the present trends of gradual, indeliberate, institutionalized cooperation 
continue, they might end up by creating a third bloc - the non-aligned 
bloc. 94 
In any event, NAM cannot intentionally or unintentionally avoid the process of 
institutionalization. Although NAM began as a reaction to bloc politics, it is undeniable 
that an institutionalized NAM, works like a bloc because it fosters cooperation among 
members and results in members adopting foreign policy in accordance with NAM's 
decisions. 
C. Substance: Contributions of the Non-Aligned Movement to International Law 
Like any institution, NAM has guiding values and operates according to them. Based 
on these values, the Third World, in general, and the Non-Aligned Movement in par-
ticular, have formed their own views on the international system and international law. 
In general, the Third World desires participation in international organizations to voice 
their concerns and amend international law accordingly. In pursuit of this goal, the 
Third World, through NAM, has contributed procedurally and substantively to inter-
national law. 
NAM's most conspicuous contribution to international law has been the process of 
consensus which has been adopted by the United Nations and other international or-
ganizations. The use of a consensus began in NAM because of "the earlier club-like 
conception of the NAM as a loose grouping of twenty-five like-minded states meeting to 
talk through problems of mutual interest."95 Voting was not consistent with NAM's 
ideologies because it might infringe on the independent foreign policy of each member 
and thus produce a third bloc. Consequently, the idea of consensus, rather than voting, 
is better suited to NAM's principles. 
Consensus is defined as "the adoption of a text without a vote and [with] no 
objection."96 However, the consensus used at NAM and subsequently at the United 
Nations is not as rigid as this definition. At the Sixth Summit Conference, consensus was 
defined as: 
[B]oth a process and a final compromise formula, shaped by prior consul-
tations, discussions, and negotiations into a generally agreed position. In 
other words, consensus is a general convergence and harmonization of views 
93 For text of the decision Regarding the Composition and Mandate of the Co-ordinating 
Bureau of the Fifth Summit Conference, see 27 REV. INT'L AFF. 44-45 (1976). 
94 Rajan, supra note 46, at 52. 
95 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 39. 
96 E. Suy, The Meaning of Consensus in Multilateral Diplomacy, in AKKERMAN, DECLARATIONS ON 
PRINCIPLES - A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 472 (1977). 
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reflecting the broadest consent of the Conference or Meeting enhancing or 
at least preserving the unity and strength of the Movement.97 
As this definition implies, consensus is the lowest common denominator. Although 
the effectiveness of a consensus has been disputed because it is less binding, a consensus 
allows member states to compromise in the interest of NAM's unity without being 
accountable to domestic coll8tituencies or third parties. In addition, the use of a consensus 
allows member states to record reservations to declarations. 
At the United Nations, resolutions of the General Assembly have been adopted by 
consensus as standard procedure when there is near unanimity. Specifically, NAM's 
formula of decision by consensus without voting has replaced the concept of consensus 
as an alternative to a roll-call vote in many committees of the UN.98 The frequent use 
of consensus in the United Nations, however, bas reduced the legal value of its decisions 
because decisions made by consensus are less binding. An arbitral tribunal appointed by 
the International Court of Justice in a dispute between Libya and the Texaco Overseas 
Petroleum Corporation found that resolutions adopted by consensus could have legal 
value when the consensus was reached by "a majority of states belonging to the various 
representative groupS."99 Hence, consensus as developed by NAM is important because 
"it can be a first-step in the evolution of a customary rule of international law."loo 
However, the increased use of consensus had led to a questioning of legal effect of the 
General Assembly resolutions which are passed by consensus. 
The United Nations General Assembly is NAM's vocal forum. NAM's preeminence, 
to the extent that its members can agree, is ensured by the UN Charter's stipulation that 
"each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote."IOI NAM's voice in the 
General Assembly has become more important in light of the reduced role of the Security 
Council. In recent years, tension between the Superpowers has prevented the Security 
Council from acting, thus shifting power to the General Assembly. Consquently, NAM 
has heightened its voice at the General Assembly where it has preponderant numerical 
power. 
NAM uses resolutions of the General Assembly as a tool to realize its own demands. 
The legal validity of these resolutions, however, has bl;!en disputed in international law. 
The question is whether resolutions can become a source of internati.onallaw. The Third 
World, First World, and Second World each have a different opinion. 
The Third World insists that General Assembly resolutions, like recommendations 
or declarations, are legally binding on member states. This viewpoint arises because 
Third World countries occupy over two-thirds of the United N;nions General Assembly 
and hence, they can pass resolutions at will. 
Second World countries have a different view on the binding effect of General 
Assembly resolutions. Among Second World countries, "there is complete agreement as 
97 See Recommendation III. Decisionmaking by Consensus, Annex I of the Final Declaration 
- Decision on the Methods of Strengthening Unity, Solidarity and Cooperation among Non-
Aligned Countries, reprinted in 30 REv. INT'L AFr. 66 (1979). 
98 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 182. For example, the consensus was used in June 1976, by the 
Special Committee of Twenty-Four of the United Nations on Decolonization denouncing South 
Africa's continued admini.tration of Namibia. 
99 Texaco Overseas Petroleum et al. v. Libyan Republic, reprinted in 17 I. L. M. 1 (1977). 
100 J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 160 (1977). 
101 See U.N. CHARTER art. 18. 
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to· the political and moral influence of the resolutions-recommendations of . .. tpe 
General Assembly, if such resolutions have been adopted by the votes of States belongin~ 
to all existing principal political groups."102 Their criteria for a binding resolution i~ 
"whether it is recognized by member states and applied in practice."105 
The United States, representative of the First World, usually refuses to recognize 
General Assembly resolutions as legally binding. 104 At the first session of the working 
group concerning the mandatory force of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States (CERDS), representatives of First World countries expressed "doubt that it was 
•.. possible ... to make the rights and duties set forth in a draft Charter binding upon 
States."105 Thus, First World countries generally refuse to grant legal value to resolutions. 
The rationale behind this opposition to the generally binding effect of resolutions might 
be the First World's minority position at the UN. If First World countries composed a 
majority of the General Assembly, they would surely insist on the binding effect of 
resolutions. Similarly, if the Superpowers had veto power at the General Assembly, it is 
likely that they would agree to the binding effect of resolutions. 
In some cases, however, where the principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
are interpreted and applied authoritatively, a resolution may have direct legal effect. 106 
"While it is now possible to recognize that resolutions of the UN have a certain legal 
value, this legal value differs considerably, depending on the type of resolution, its 
provisions and the conditions attached to its adoption."lo, Hence, although a resolution 
was adopted by a majority, if the proponents did not include various representative 
groups, the resolution would not have legal value. Thus, th€ Third World cannot rely 
on the legal validity of a resolution even if passed by a m~ority of the General Assembly, 
when the majority is composed primarily of Third World countries. The Third World 
should try to persuade the First World to change its position or seek a compromise 
regarding the inconsistent views on the legal validity of resolutions. 
International law, however, is a developing body oflaw. As the Third World majority 
in the General Assembly passes important resolutions, the accumulated voices of the 
Third World will ·affect future international law. Furthermore, the resolutions of the 
-Qe~eral Assembly will contribute to the progressive development of international law 
and solidify customary rules of international law. lOS Although nations do not agree that 
resolutions of the General Assembly are legally binding, it is recognized that these 
re80lut~Qns ,have legal merit in international law. Throughout the history of the United 
Nations,a ;feW. ~!!solutions have been consistently cited and reaffirmed in subsequent 
resolutions. FreqV!intly, these important resolutions involve issues that previously have 
been a~dressed.b~iNAM in some form of resolution or declaration. loo For example, the 
contribution Qf NA-M to international law includes these norms: the end of colonialism; 
the end of racial discrimination and apartheid; disarmament; non-intervention; self-
L1 
102 Tunkin, supra note 30, at 68. 
10. MARIS, INTERNATIONAL LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 56 (1984). 
I"/d. at 56. 
10. Report of the Working Party on its first session, UN Doc. YD/B/AC.12/1 (1973) quoted in L. 
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAw 110 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN]. 
106 For an example of this, see the Declaration on the Elimination of All Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations, in BROWNUE, supra note 16, at 15. 
10' Texaco Overseas Petroleum, 17 I.L.M. at 30. 
108 BROWNUE, supra note 16, at 14. 
109 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 170. 
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determination; the New International Economic Order; the New World Information 
Order; the New World Cultural Order; and peaceful co-existence. These norms, reflect 
the common thread of anti-colonialism which has been central to NAM's identity and 
which was later incorporated into important General Assembly resolutions. Therefore, 
the future impact of the Third World through NAM is already apparent through its 
significant contributions to the development of international law. NAM's contributions 
to international law must be considered separately to assess their significance. 
1. Anti-Colonialism 
NAM's predominant concern is anti-colonialism. NAM members believe colonialism 
and neo-colonialism to be the root of their present status as "underdeveloped" nations 
in the international system. liD Even before the First Summit Conference, the Afro-Asian 
countries at the Bandung Conference in 1955 declared the end of colonialism. III This 
prompted the passing of the General Assembly resolution 1514, "The Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" which calls for the 
end of colonialism in all forms. 
NAM's anti-colonial campaign has been successful. Except for Namibia, the only 
remaining colonies are a handful of island dependencies, mostly in the Pacific and the 
Caribbean. Although decolonization seems virtually complete, at the Seventh Summit 
Conference in 1983, NAM continued to insist on anti-colonialism.ll2 
2. Self-Determination 
Self-determination is complementary to decolonization. Originally framed as a uni-
versal process toward self-government, 113 the principle of self-determination is promoted 
by the Third World because the principle relates to decolonization and independence. 1I4 
However, self-determination should not be limited to the decolonization and indepen-
dence of a nation. The principle of self-determination also protects struggles by peoples 
for their own cultural identity within a country as well as a colony's struggle for inde-
pendence. 
NAM's repeated affirmation of the right to self-determination has given it a nor-
mative character. Consequently, the General Assembly recommendation that "the Mem-
ber States of the United Nations shall uphold the principle of self-determination of all 
peoples and nations"115 resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960.116 This Declaration is signifi-
cant because it incorporates the principle of self-determination as part of the obligations 
present in the UN Charter. Thus, the principle of self-determination is no longer a mere 
recommendation. Rather, self-determination is accepted as "an accurate statement of 
liD See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
III See Final Communique of the Bandung Conference, 24 April 1955, reprinted in DOCUMENTS 
ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955 (N. Frankland & P. Woodcock ed. 1958). 
1I2 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
1I3 Article 1 and 55 of the UN Charter refer to "self-determination of peoples," as a purpose 
of the United Nations. Article 73 states that "to develop self-government" is a responsibility of UN 
Members for non-self-governing territories. 
1I4 See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (1984). 
1I5 G.A. Res. 637, U.N. Doc. AJ7 (1952). 
1I6 G.A. Res. 1514, reprinted in 1960 U.N.Y.B. 49. 
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modern international law."1l7 In addition, this statement was affirmed by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Namibia and Western Sahara cases1l8 and is also set forth in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966). Hence, as a result of NAM's efforts, anti-colonialism has 
become a reality and self-determination has been established as a legal principle. 
3. Racial Discrimination and Apartheid 
NAM and the General Assembly have continually condemned the policy of apartheid 
and racial discrimination in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. 1l9 NAM considers 
policies of racial discrimination to be another version of colonialism: "the fight against 
racial discrimination has become an extension of the struggle to end the system of 
colonialism." 120 
Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965) defines the term "racial discrimination" as 
... any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or other origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedom in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. l2l 
While a complete body of universal international law binding all states to protect 
human rights may not exist, the principle of racial non-discrimination has a different 
status in international law. Many nations support the view that "there is in international 
law today a legal principle of non-discrimination which at least applies in matters of 
race."122 The majority of the International Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction Case 
(1970) referred to racial non-discrimination as erga omnes.123 Thus, NAM has succeeded 
in its advocacy of non-discrimination as a legal principle and has contributed this prin-
ciple to international law. 
4. Non-Intervention l24 
The Non-Aligned Movement's commitment to the principle of non-intervention in 
the internal or external affairs of each state is a logical extension of its commitment to 
the principle of anti-colonialism. The Third World believes that any kind of intervention 
may be detrimental to sovereignty or independence. Thus, since the Bandung Confer-
117 AKEHURST, supra note 114, at 252. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 593-96. 
1I8 Namibia Case (1971) I.C.]. 16,31; Western Sahara Case (1975) I.C.]. 12,31-33. 
119 For example, there were Resolutions 1780 (XVII) of December 1962, 1904 (XVIII) of 
November 1963 and 1906 (XVIII) of November 1963 which proclaimed the end of racial discrim-
ination. 
120 Mojsov, Dimensions of Non-Alignment, 55 MEDJUNARODNA POLITIKA (1982). 
121 BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (1983). 
122 BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 596. 
123 See supra note 17, at 302. 
124 The term "intervention" is not adequately defined by international law scholars or through 
state practice. However, many writers use the term to mean "dictatorial interference in the domestic 
or foreign affairs of another state which impairs that state's independence." See BRIERLY, THE LAW 
OF NATIONS 402 (1963). 
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ence, NAM has reiterated its belief that "interference in the internal affairs of states is 
totally unacceptable."125 
NAM's commitment to the principle of non-intervention is incorporated in the 1965 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States. 126 
This Declaration, proposed by the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, provides 
that a state does not have the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. 127 
5. Disarmamentl28 
One of motives behind NAM's organization was the Third World's fear of war 
resulting from the rigid polarization and the Superpowers' arms race. Thus, NAM 
believes that disarmament should have normative status in international law. 
In NAM, disarmament is another version of anti-colonialism. NAM regards the 
Superpowers' nuclear dominance as an effort to make the Third World powerless. In 
addition, NAM believes that disarmament would be economically beneficial to the Third 
World because arms reduction would increase the capital available for economic aid to 
the Third World. 
In addition to supporting a series of resolutions by the General Assembly on dis-
armament,129 NAM called for a world disarmament conference at The Fifth Summit 
Conference at Colombo (1976) and refined their demand at a General Assembly Special 
Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in 1978 and 1982. 
Although NAM did not fully succeed in realizing its intention to stop the arms race 
between the Superpowers, the non-aligned countries succeeded "in creating world public 
opinion [in favor] of complete disarmament."13o Although NAM considers disarmament 
a version of anti-colonialism, it may be that disarmament unlike colonialism, is a problem 
which NAM can not solve independently. 
6. The New International Economic Orderl31 
NAM has maintained that the major cause of the present economic underdevelop-
ment of the Third World is due to their former colonial status. NAM labels the present 
economic structure of most developing nations as "neo-colonialism"132 because the Third 
World remains economically subordinate to developed countries. 
125 Quoted in T.V. SURRA RAo, Non-Alignment in International Law and Politics 142 (1981). 
126 G. A. Res. 2131 (1965). 
127 See 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) at II, U.N. Doc. A/6014. 
128 U.N. CHARTER arts. 11,26 and 47 refer to disarmament. However, the issue of disarmament 
in international law is in the formative stages, primarily because states do not have an obligation to 
disarm. See TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 79 (1974). 
129 For a compilation of U.N. resolutions on disarmament from 1946 to 1976, see Disarmament 
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, 2 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I) (1978). In December 
1978, the General Assembly adopted 41 resolutions on disarmament questions. See IS UN CHRON-
ICLE 33 (Feb. 1979). 
1'0 RAo, supra note 125, at 146. For example consider: the Moscow partial test ban treaty (1963); 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968); the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1967); the 
Antarctic Treaty (1959); the Sen Bed Treaty (1972); and SALT (1972). 
1'1 See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. 
I32 JACKSON, supra note 36, at 172. 
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The Third World through the Non-Aligned Movement, has demanded reform of 
the international economic system. NAM's main contribution has been its clear articu-
lation of the demands of the Third World which has forced developed nations to 
negotiate reforms in economic policy. In 1962, the Cairo Economic Conference on 
Development began the negotiation ptocess which led to the establishment of UNCT AD 
in 1964. The Second Summit Conference at Cairo in 1964, following the first UNCTAD 
meeting at Geneva, adopted a declaration referring fot the first time to the need for a 
"new international economic policy." This declaration foreshadowed NAM's demand for 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO). At the Third Summit Conference at 
Lusaka in 1970, NAM again was emphatic about economic issues, and adopted the 
Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress. 
The Fourth Summit Conference at Algiers in 1973 played a critical role in the 
launching of NIEO in 1974. The Fourth Summit identified the existing economic order 
as a legacy of colonialism and the chairman of the conference proposed NIEO at the 
1974 sixth special session of the General Assembly. The special session adopted without 
a vote, but with reservations by developed countries, a Program of Action for the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order. This program was directly based 
on the opinions voiced at the Fourth Summit. Subsequently, the regular session of the 
General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) 
by a lopsided vote of 118-6. The dissents were six developed countries including the 
United States. 
Although the adoption of the NIEO and CERDS has prompted discussion and 
publication on the new international economic system, these concepts have little sub-
stantive value in international law. For example, in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Case the 
International Court of Justice indicated that the resolutions establishing NIEO and 
CERDS were ineffective because they were not supported by any of the developed 
countries whose market economies support international trade.133 Although Third World 
countries insist on the binding effect of NIEO and CERDS,134 developed nations" ... 
dislike the attempt by the General Assembly resolutions on the New International Eco-
nomic Order to create a legal obligation for richer states to help poorer states."US Today, 
the demand for international economic reform by the Third World seems to be at a 
stalemate. To resolve this deadlock, NAM should demand less radical reforms and 
persuade developed countries to concede more without demanding an international 
obligation. 
7. The New World Information Order 
The concept of a New World Information Order has been endorsed by NAM. The 
negative attitude towards the Western-dominated, worldwide news media was first voiced 
at the Fourth Summit Conference at Algiers. This Conference concluded that developing 
countries should reorganize the existing communication networks inherited from their 
colonial past. U6 In 1976, NAM established a separate Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool 
IS' See Texaco Overseas Petroleum, 17 I.L.M. 29 (1978). 
134 See HENKIN, supra note 105, at 110. 
135 AKEHURST, supra note 114, at 199. 
I'. For text of the Action Program of Economic Cooperation, see 24 REV. INT'L AFF. 28 (1973). 
58 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:37 
to advance the New World Information Order's (NWIO) objectives and to eventually 
serve as a single, inter-governmental news service throughout the Third World. 
As the result of NAM's effort to establish a New World Information Order, the 
General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO), adopted a compromise text for the "Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles." The Declaration discusses the potential contribution of the mass media to 
strengthening peace and international understanding. m Article I of the Declaration 
demands the free flow of information with wider and better balanced dissemination of 
information. This declaration reflects the compromise between the developed countries' 
position that information should be allowed to flow freely and the Third World's position 
that there should be balanced dissemination of information. 
Following the UNESCO declaration, the General Assembly approved resolutions 331 
115A and 33/115B in response to the controversy over information dissemination. Res-
olution 33/115A calls for increased assistance to developing countries in communication 
technology, while Resolution 33/115B affirms the need to establish a more effective 
world information and communication order. 138 
UNESCO's 1980 Belgrade General Conference passed a resolution specifying eleven 
points to be considered in order to realize the objective of NWIO.139 The resolution 
emphasized the free flow of information and the development of communication capac-
ities in the Third World. Although the free flow of information was provided for in the 
two UNESCO documents, the practice of the Third World has been to control the flow 
of information passing across borders. Technical and financial aid from the First World, 
however, has restrained the extreme demand for governmental control of information 
flow. 
The legal validity of NWIO is uncertain because it has not been enunciated clearly 
by the United Nations. The Third World's position that governmental control over the 
flow of information is necessary for their national development may conflict with prin-
ciples of international law. Governmental involvement may violate the fundamental right 
to communicate recognized in the Universal Declarations of Human Rights (Article 19), 
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the UN Chapter (Articles 55, 56), and the UNESCO 
Constitution (Article 1). Accordingly, those Third World countries which voted in favor 
of these documents are obliged to vote against a NWIO which provides for governmental 
control. The Third World must not ignore the First World because NWIO's objectives 
cannot be achieved without the help of developed countries. 
The mere declaration of these new orders without the understanding and support 
of other parties will not enable the new orders to achieve normative status. Thus, NAM 
must remember that the codification of its principles into "new international orders" like 
the NIEO, NWIO, the New Scientific and Technological Order (NSTO),140 and the New 
World Cultural Order (NWCO),141 is merely a formal statement of Third World concerns. 
I" See ANN. REV. U.N. AFF. 238 (1979). 
13. [d. at 240-4l. 
139 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/19 (21st Sess. 1980). 
140 See S. Kumar, Non-Alignment and the New Scientific and Technological Order, 20 INT'L STUD. 
151-58 (1981). 
HI The Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies was adopted at the World Conference on 
Cultural Policies (1982). See UNESCO, World Conference on Cultural Policies: Final Report (1982). 
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8. Peaceful Coexistence 
The five principles of coexistence, also known as the Panchsheel, were endorsed by 
the United Nations through the efforts of NAM. At the First Summit at Belgrade in 
1961, peaceful coexistence was understood as "an active international co-operation 
among peoples."142 The principle of peaceful coexistence includes "the right of self-
determination ofthe ex-colonial territories and independence and the free determination 
of forms and methods of economic, social, and cultural development."143 
At the insistence of the NAM countries, the Declaration of Principles on Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations was adopted by the General Assembly in 1970. This declaration 
is legally effective as an authoritative interpretation and application of the principles of 
the Charter. 144 Among the Charter's principles, those of self-determination, refraining 
from the use of force, sovereign equality, and the obligation of non-intervention and 
cooperation are principles which NAM has supported continuously from its inception. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article demonstrates that the Third World, through the Non-Aligned Move-
ment can be deemed a single international legal system. 
First, the cultural diversity of the Third World does not hinder the Third World's 
contributions to international law. Contemporary international law is an inter-cultural 
law that has developed from culturally specific laws of different nations and regions. 
Although the Third World is composed of culturally diverse nations, it shares a common 
bond of anti-colonialism and self-determination which characterizes the Third World's 
position in international law and in international relations. The common anti-colonial 
tradition of the Third World enables it to function as a single legal system which 
contributes regional laws from which international law can develop. As international law 
incorporates diverse regional laws its effectiveness increases because it is applicable to 
more nations. 
Second, in reality, both universal and non-universal international law exists. In some 
respects contemporary international law appears to be non-universal because it reflects 
the increased cultural diversity of the different regions in the world. This article, how-
ever, indicates that universal international law develops inductively from regional non-
universal law, such as the principles of self-determination and the NIEO, which have 
been adopted as universal principles of international law. Thus, the Third World as a 
source of non-universal regional law contributes to international law as a single legal 
system. 
Finally this article shows that the Third World, through the Non-Aligned Movement, 
has the requisite "values, structure and substance" necessary to compose a legal system. 
Anti-colonialism is the predominant value guiding the Non-Aligned Movement. The 
Non-Aligned Movement has institutionalized in order to effectively organize policy and 
coordinate NAM's activities. Finally, the substantive law of the Third World is evident 
in the Non-Aligned Movement's contributions to international law. 
142 RAo, supra note 125, at 141. 
143 [d. at 141. 
144 BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 15. 
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The substantive development of international law since World War II has been 
largely influenced by the Third World. However, in comparison to studies on the Eu-
ropean Community or the Soviet international legal system, the study of the Third 
World as an individual legal system in international law has been neglected. The Third 
World through the Non-Aligned Movement is an international legal system that has 
contributed substantive law to the global international legal system. Accordingly, inter-
national law and international legal scholars should increase their attention to the Non-
Aligned Movement and the Third World since they are and will be influential forces in 
the development of international law. 
